This paper argues that the legacy potential of a rm's strategy is an important determinant of CEO compensation, turnover and strategy change. A legacy makes CEO replacement expensive, because rm performance can only partially be attributed to a newly employed manager.
This paper proposes a model of CEO replacement and puts forward a novel determinant for turnover decisions: the legacy potential of a rm's strategy. We mean by this the extent to which a manager's decisions a ect future rm cash ows, potentially beyond the manager's own tenure. The replacement of a CEO is arguably one of the most important decisions a rm takes. Yet, the theoretical and empirical nance literature has relatively little to say about the rm and manager specic characteristics that lead to one manager being red and replaced by another. As Brickley (2003) points out, the only variable that predicts turnover empirically is poor rm performance, but it has little predictive power. Theoretical papers on managerial turnover tend to reduce CEO successions to a sequence of static interactions (see below for more details). As such they do not distinguish between a CEO who is hired and can start a fresh project, or one who is constrained in this choice because he inherits a predecessor's long-term strategy. Our paper focuses on this latter phenomenon and investigates turnover decisions when strategy choices have a legacy potential.
The fact that a dynamic link exists between a CEO and his predecessor is probably more recognized in the accounting literature than in nance. Pourciau (1993) for example provides evidence that the successor of a CEO who has left the rm for non-routine reasons, tends to depress accounting earnings during his rst year in o ce. Pourciau interprets this as an attempt 'to take a bath while still being able to blame the predecessor.' Similarly, Weisbach (1995) nds that forced CEO turnover increases the probability of a subsequent divestiture of a poorly performing subsidiary. In addition, there is rich anecdotal evidence that illustrates the prevalence of the blame game in which CEO successors often engage, with the corresponding challenge for outsiders to attribute responsibility fairly. 1 In spite of this, we are not aware of any theory that explains the dynamic interaction between successor and predecessor CEOs.
We consider a set-up in which a rm manager can be incentivized explicitly through per- 1 For example, when Mike Parton, former CEO of Marconi, was asked "How much blame do you accept for Marconi's [...] troubles?" he replied that "You can't be part of management and just wash your hands of it. However, I was not a board member when the key strategic decisions were made, and it's di cult to say what my view might have been had I been on the board at the time." (Institutional Investor, April 2004.) formance related pay, and implicitly through reputational concerns. A manager's reputation in the labor market a ects his prospects for future, high level employment (see Holmstrom, 1982 , and Gibbons and Murphy, 1992 , for explicit models of such career concerns and Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal, 2005, for survey evidence on the importance of career concerns for top executives). The manager needs to take a long-term strategic decision the quality of which depends on his intrinsic and unknown ability. Like Gopalan, Milbourn, and Song (2009) we thus view the choice of strategy as one of the most important tasks of a CEO.
After a strategy has been chosen it needs to be implemented, which requires managerial e ort. Cash ows are generated over two periods and depend both on the initial choice of strategy and on the implementation e ort. The rm can dismiss the incumbent manager after poor performance and hire a new manager to continue the project's implementation.
We show that in the presence of reputational concerns, a poorly performing CEO will not be red, i.e., the incumbent CEO is entrenched. The reason is that a red manager's legacy makes it more di cult to incentivize a successor CEO, because the latter can blame poor performance on his predecessor. By the same token, the incumbent CEO is relatively easy to incentivize, because he has a vested interest in seeing his strategy succeed. As a result, higher explicit incentives for the new manager have to replace the implicit incentives of the incumbent, which is costly to the rm. In our setting, entrenchment occurs, although the board of directors acts in shareholders' interest. Our nding thus challenges the view that entrenchment is an instance of governance failure in the form of a captive board of directors (see Bebchuk and Fried, 2004 or Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003) .
Second, we explore how the presence of a legacy a ects the joint decision to change manager and strategy. We show that the rm will always change the manager if it changes its strategy. This is because the manager's reputation is linked to his original decision, which gives him an incentive to 'sabotage' the new strategy. This nding is related to the growing literature on "managerial style" (starting with Bertrand and Schoar, 2003) , which identies manager xed e ects in a ecting rm performance as well as an association between managers and specic strategy choices. That literature takes it largely for granted that these ndings are explained by managers' innate characteristics such as strategy specic skills. 2 We put forward an alternative view that can explain the close association between manager and strategy change purely on the basis of incentive problems but that does not require manager innate characteristics. We believe our approach is more in line with recent evidence that CEOs are increasingly 'generalists' (see Frydman, 2007 or Murphy and Zabojnik, 2007 ).
Although our model makes the same prediction about the manager -strategy association as the managerial style literature, it has numerous other implications, which allow the two to be distinguished empirically. These are developed in detail in the paper.
A direct implication of the previous nding is that rms exhibit strategy inertia. In the presence of reputational concerns, the rm faces a cost when it changes strategy: It forgoes the advantage of employing a manager who is incentivized strongly by the desire to prove that his original strategy choice was correct. The rm may therefore refrain from changing strategy (and manager) even when it knows that an alternative strategy is more likely to be protable.
In order to identify more clearly the causes of entrenchment and inertia, we allow managerial ability to matter for two distinct reasons. In the basic model, managerial ability is crucial for strategy choice, but not for implementation. We extend the model to allow managerial ability to a ect implementation. When ability is crucial for implementation, a strategy can be said to have less legacy potential: Success of a new manager now depends less on the original strategy choice, and more on the new manager's ability to implement it successfully. We show that weakening a strategy's legacy potential weakens entrenchment and strategic inertia. Finally, we distinguish between internal and external replacements and show that when the legacy potential is weakened, an internal successor may be preferred over an external one.
An important contribution of the paper is to provide new determinants of managerial turnover. We predict that the frequency of (forced) managerial turnover should be negatively correlated with a rm's legacy potential. This implies that the sensitivity of turnover with respect to performance should be lower when the legacy potential is higher. In order to implement such predictions, we discuss further in the paper possible proxies for legacy potential: We are not aware of any empirical study that has investigated this relationship.
Also, following a strategic decision with legacy potential, we would expect to see a grace period for a manager, during which poor performance does not lead to ring. We would then expect to see an increase in ring after that grace period. There is empirical evidence to support this observation. Allgood and Farrell (2003) and Coates and Kraakman (2007) nd that the hazard rate of turnover increases during the rst 4-5 years of a CEO's tenure and then declines. Moreover, consistent with our theory, Allgood and Farrell (2000) nd that (non-founder) CEOs experience a "period of apparent entrenchment during their intermediate years that weakens later in their tenure." (p.373).
Next, our results predict both a reluctance to change strategy after bad performance, and a close association between (outside) managerial replacement and major changes in the rm's strategy. Taken together, these two predictions can help to understand why CEO turnover is signicantly correlated with strategic change, while poor performance alone is not (see for instance Romanelli and Tushman, 1994 , Khurana and Nohria, 2000 , or Gordon, Stewart, Sweo and Luker, 2000 . Also, in case the incumbent CEO is dismissed, internal successions are more likely to occur when an existing strategy is maintained, and external successions when it is changed. This is because top managers partially share the responsibility for the initial strategy choice, and can be incentivized through reputational concerns.
Our theory also allows us to link CEO turnover to pay and strategy change in a way that allows novel empirical predictions to test our theory. We predict that a new CEO who replaces a poorly performing predecessor, should receive a steeper incentive scheme and higher average pay, compared to that of a (retained) incumbent. And conditional on replacing a manager, the incentives for a new CEO should be atter when accompanied by a strategy change. Furthermore, our model generates new results regarding the impact of corporate governance on the level of CEOs incentive pay. While the literature has emphasized that strong boards decrease average CEO pay (see for instance Core, Holthausen and Larcker 1999), our model predicts that board strength should decrease the incentive compensation of successor CEOs.
Finally, we identify reputational concerns as a possible contractual friction that prevents rms from reallocating assets to their more productive use. Our analysis can shed light on the empirical ndings of Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) who document that the benets of capital reallocation are underexploited during recessions. To the extent that managerial expertise is more needed, when prots are low and investment opportunities are scarce, our model provides an explanation for the observed lack of capital reallocation.
Our approach to the problem of turnover and strategy change is based on a standard agency framework, considered in many related contexts such as executive compensation (for an overview see Murphy, 1999) . A completely di erent approach to managerial turnover is taken by matching theory (see Jovanovic, 1979) . It posits that turnover occurs so as to improve the quality of the match between a rm and its CEO. A weakness of this theory is that there is no clear-cut distinction between a manager who quits and one who is terminated by the rm. This di ers from our model where termination is initiated by the rm. Moreover, matching theory does not say anything about strategy change per se, nor about performance related pay. We will discuss below how our theory can be distinguished empirically from the matching theory of turnover.
A few theory papers have linked turnover, pay and strategic choice (Boot, 1992 , Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2008 , Inderst and Mueller, 2005 , Prendergast and Stole, 1996 and Sliwka, 2007 . These papers are based on an asymmetric information problem, such that a manager's decision over strategy change may reveal (potentially negative) information about his type. The above papers predict underreaction to private information (inertia) with the exception of Prendergast and Stole who show that managers may over-or underreact to private information, depending on their tenure / age. In our paper private information plays no role.
We therefore nd that rms may exhibit strategy inertia not only from the perspective of the manager's private information, but also conditional on publicly available information. This observation appears to be consistent with anecdotal evidence, whereby rms fail to adopt a new strategy in spite of a widespread understanding that the current strategy is not optimal. Furthermore, the above papers focus on the problem of incentivizing an incumbent CEO, while we focus on the interaction of the incentive problem across two generations of CEOs.
The organization of the paper is the following. Section I presents the basic model structure. In Section II, we present the benchmark case when there is no moral hazard. Section III derives the optimal retention decision and strategy choice under moral. Section IV extends the basic model to the case where managers have di erent implementation abilities.
We consider two extensions of the model to address the issues of internal versus external successions, and of the investment horizon of rms in section V. Section VI discusses the model's empirical predictions. The Appendix contains the proofs.
I. The model
An outline of the model is as follows. There are three dates = 0 1 2. A rm can undertake a project at the initial date = 0, which yields an uncertain payo at the two subsequent dates. The project choice can be thought of as a long-term strategic decision by the rm, which will a ect the rm's cash ows two periods into the future. The rm hires a manager whose task it is to make this strategic choice and to implement it subsequently. At an interim date, a cash ow is realized. The rm's board also observes a noisy signal about the rm's optimal strategy, which may conrm or contradict the manager's original choice. Based on this information, the board can decide to retain the incumbent manager, or to replace him, and whether or not to change strategy.
A. Date 0
There is a rm whose board of directors acts so as to maximize shareholder value. In order to start operating, the rm needs to hire a manager. There is a large pool of potential managers, who are risk neutral and have limited liability. There are two types of managers, { } and managers' types are not observed by anyone, including the managers themselves. The probability that a manager is a 'high ability' type, = is given by 0 . If the rm wishes to hire a manager it picks one from the pool and o ers him a wage contract. We will describe below what wage contracts may look like.
We now describe the continuation game that follows if the rm has hired a manager.
In order for the rm to have any chance of generating positive cash ows, the manager needs to choose its strategy. Assume that strategies can be chosen from the set of real numbers If he has low ability ( = ), his signal is randomly chosen from [0 1] and therefore Pr ( = | = ) = 0. The manager then chooses a strategy 0 based on his signal . Note that the manager has a zero probability of picking if he does not follow his signal, while this probability is strictly positive if he chooses 0 = . 3 Our results go through if we assume that a low ability manager can sometimes choose a good strategy. What matters for our analysis is that the project quality cannot be perfectly inferred from cash ow realizations.
Our approach views managers as important for the original strategy formulation, and not merely for implementation which is what most of the research on executive compensation 3 Even though we can think of the strategy choice as requiring approval from the board, it e ectively remains the manager's decision in our set-up, because the board has no information about at = 0. Moreover, we show below that the manager has no incentive to propose a 'bad' strategy and the board will therefore always approve the manager's proposal. has focused on. Our assumption that CEOs are responsible for the initial strategy choice is shared, among others with Dow and Raposo (2005) After having observed 1 and the board needs to make the following decisions. Firstly, the board needs to decide whether it wants to continue operating the original strategy, or whether it wants to switch to a di erent strategy. We denote by 1 the board's choice of strategy at date 1. With a slight abuse of notation, we will note 1 { ; 0 }. 4 Secondly, the board needs to decide whether to retain the incumbent manager or re him. This decision is noted { }, where = stands for the decision to keep the manager, and = stands for the decision to re him. If he is red, the board can approach a manager from the pool for employment in the following period. 5 Finally, the board needs to set a wage contract that it o ers to whoever runs the rm in the next period. The manager now in place can choose an e ort level 2 { 2 2 } where 0 2 . High 4 By assumption, the strategy choice is a continuous variable between 0 and 1. However, it is straightforward to see that the board has no incentive to choose a random strategy other than the initial strategy 0 or since the probability to pick would then be zero. 5 It is more convenient in our setting to assume that the strategy is chosen before the board decides on the re-employment decision. This simplies the interim participation constraint of the incumbent manager: Were he to resign, the board would not change strategy when recruiting a new manager. However, the results go through if we modify the timing of events. e ort 2 accrues a cost ( 2 ) = 0 to the manager, low e ort 2 accrues no cost, so that
C. Date 2
At the nal date, cash ows 2 {0 2 } from the project are realized. As before, the nal distribution of cash ows depends on the strategy in place after date 1, and now also on the manager's choice of e ort level.
The structure is the same as before: If 1 = the date 2 cash ow is 2 = 2 0 with probability 2 and 2 = 0 with complementary probability 1 2 for either type of manager. If instead 1 6 = , the date 2 cash ow is always zero, regardless of the identity of the manager, or his choice of e ort. We relax this assumption later by allowing high ability managers to generate positive cash ows with a strictly positive probability, i.e., they can 'rescue' a poor strategy.
We also assume that managers care about their reputation when they stop working for the rm (or when the project stops). With a manager's reputation we mean the probability with which he is a high type, conditional on the manager's employment history. The latter consists of the number of periods the manager has been under employment at the rm, performance observations 1 and 2 and the board's decision to continue with the original strategy or switch to a new one.
In some states of nature, the type of the manager is perfectly revealed.
it is known for sure that 0 = and that the manager has picked the correct strategy.
His reputation jumps to one, since he is for sure a high type. This is also the case if 1 = 0 and = 0 . The board's and the manager's signals can only be equal, if they identied the correct strategy In that case, too, the manager is for sure a high type.
The only remaining uncertainty is when 1 = 0 and 6 = 0 . In that case, we denote by 2 1 Pr ( = | 1 = 0 2 6 = 0 1 ) the date 2 reputation of the manager who was hired at the initial date. To ease the exposition, we will drop the subscript whenever the retention policy does not a ect the nal reputation.
Moreover, we assume that if the manager is red at date 1, he remains unemployed for one period. After that, his reputation is updated on the basis of the rm's cash ows and strategy choice. The manager's reputation therefore continues to evolve even when he no longer works for the rm, so that is the reputation that is relevant when he re-enters the labor market. We assume that having a reputation of has value ( ) = to the manager, where 0. This can be viewed as the present value of his future wage payments, which may depend on his reputation in the labor market. 6 The fact that ( ) is linear in simplies the comparative statics, but does not a ect the main results of the analysis. 6 We do not endogenize this function for the sake of tractability. See Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999) for a comprehensive analysis of career concerns models. This assumption is also consistent with the empirical evidence by Fee and Hadlock (2003) who show that managers who are promoted to CEO positions at new rms come from rms with better than average past stock price performance. More generally, a manager may also care about non-monetary aspects of reputation, such as private benets from receiving positive press coverage.
If a new manager was hired at the interim date, we denote his date 2 reputation by 2 1 . We assume that reputation is valued in the same way by the new manager, so that his reputational concern is given by the same function ( ).
II. The benchmark case: contractible e ort
Given that managers' actions are partially driven by the evolution of their reputation, it is useful to determine the optimal e ort level, strategy choice, and re-employment policy of shareholders in the case where e ort is contractible. This will clarify the denition of entrenchment and strategy inertia under moral hazard.
The board's choices over strategy and retention at the interim date are conditional on 1 and 0 . Let 1 denote the probability that the rm is operating the "correct" strategy at date 1, after having taken a decision on 1 . From the above discussion and the application of Bayes' rule, we can write the value of 1 as a function of the history as follows 
where
To make the incentive problem interesting, we consider a benchmark where shareholders wish to induce 2 . The following lemma provides a necessary and su cient condition for this. It also characterizes the optimal strategy choice of shareholders.
Lemma 1 : It is optimal for shareholders to induce high e ort 2 if and only if cash-ows are su ciently large, in the sense that :
In that case, the optimal strategy choice is the following:
e. the initial strategy is maintained.
• If 1 = 0 and
For any realization of 1 and , the board is indi erent between ring and retaining the initial manager at date 1.
Lemma 1 has a natural interpretation. Firstly, high e ort is desirable if the marginal benet of e ort is larger than the marginal cost (condition (4)). Secondly, the strategy remains unchanged whenever the probability of it being the correct strategy (conditional on all observable variables) is higher than that another strategy is correct. This is obviously the case when 0 is correct with certainty, i.e., when 1 = 1 or = 0 . On the other hand, when 1 = 0 and 6 = 0 , Bayesian updates are not degenerate. A comparison of (2) and (3) yields
Condition (5) illustrates the role of the board in changing strategy. When the board is weak and is low, the board will tend to remain passive after observing negative performance. It will thus ignore its own adverse signal about strategy choice and continue with the existing strategy. On the other hand, when the board is strong and is high, it will become active and change strategy in response to its own information.
Last, note that the employment decision is not an issue when there is no moral hazard problem. We will see below that this is no longer true when considering the interaction between moral hazard and reputation concerns. For the remainder of the analysis, we assume that condition (4) holds.
III. The board's optimization problem under moral hazard
We now assume that cash ows are contractible, but the e ort level is not, i.e., there is a standard moral hazard problem. Note that wage payments now serve to provide e ort incentives, but they do not play any role in a ecting the manager's choice of strategy (in contrast to the literature following Boot (1992) ). To see this note that there is no conict of interest between manager and the board regarding the initial strategy choice. Moreover, the manager's wage cannot be strictly decreasing in 1 and 2 since this would reduce his incentive to exert e ort. Finally, the manager's reputation concern provides him with an incentive to choose the best strategy at = 0. It follows that the manager optimally chooses
The contracting problem can thus be reduced to wage payments at = 2 which are contingent on all observable variables. The wage contract is denoted where the subscript { } stands for whether the incumbent ( ) or the new ( ) manager receives the wage payment. The manager's date 2 wage payments can be contingent on 1 and 2 , and on the strategy 1 pursued by the board at the interim date. We denote by the wage payment to a newly employed manager. If the incumbent is not retained there is obviously no reason to pay him any wage, so his wage is just zero in that case.
Since the manager only chooses e ort at = 1 it does not matter whether we consider long-term contracts written at = 0 or short-term contracts that are conditional on the date 1 history. For expositional purposes we choose the latter. At date 1, the board needs to choose (i) with which strategy to continue, (ii) whether to keep or re the incumbent manager, (iii) and which wage contract to o er a manager.
The generic program solved by the board is the following: We will now solve for the board's optimal decision at = 1, conditional on all possible histories. When the rm performs well initially ( 1 = 1 ) or the board receives a signal conrming the strategy choice ( = 0 ), the board's decision is straightforward: It will stick to the strategy 0 , since it is certain to be . Moreover, since the manager's reputation jumps to 1, he loses any reputational concerns. 7 The rm is therefore indi erent between employing this or another manager, and o ers a standard performance related wage contract, as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) . Such a contract pays zero in the event of a low date 2 cash ow, and pays a 'bonus' so as to satisfy the manager's incentive compatibility constraint, as stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 : If 1 = 1 and/or = 0 the optimal date 2 wage contract pays zero when 7 In a more general model either the incumbent or the new manager may have reputational concerns even when it is known that 0 = . But then the economic forces at play are essentially those that we examine for the case when it is unknown whether 0 = or not. Our simplifying assumptions are designed to allow us to focus the discussion of those economic forces. A. Board decisions following negative performance
Things are more interesting when the rm's date 1 cash ow is zero and the board receives a signal 6 = 0 . The board thus lacks any signal that would corroborate that the manager chose the correct strategy originally and in this sense he performed poorly. We then need to distinguish the case in which the board decides to continue the initial strategy (section A.1) or to change strategy (section A.2). Once we have determined wage contracts and the employment policy for each case, we can solve for the board's optimal choice of strategy (section A.3).
A.1. Optimal wage contracts and retention decision if
Consider rst the case when the rm decides to continue with the existing strategy. We can calculate the manager's nal reputation, depending on date 2 cash ows as follows. If 2 = 2 it is revealed that 1 = and thus the manager's original strategy choice was correct, i.e., 2 1 = 0 = 1. If on the other hand, 2 = 0, then:
Denote by the di erence in the value of the incumbent manager's reputation depending on whether 2 = 2 or 0, i.e.,
Note that, like before, it is optimal not to pay the manager, if the second period cash ow is low. We can then focus on the wage when the cash ow is high ( 2 = 2 ). As in the benchmark case, we also assume that it is protable for shareholders to induce e ort, i.e. the following condition holds:
We can then state the following: for the incumbent manager is given by:
The optimal wage contract if a new manager is hired is given by At that stage it has the choice of retaining the manager and paying a wage 0 2 in case of subsequent success, or hiring a new manager and paying
new manager is more expensive than retaining the incumbent manager, without yielding any benet to the rm after date 1.
To understand better what drives the di erence in wage payments for an incumbent and his successor, let us look more closely at (9) and (10) . When the incumbent manager is retained, there are two possible values of the wage payment when he performs well, depending on whether the incentive compatibility or the participation constraint is binding. 8 The 8 When the reputational concerns become very strong, the incumbent manager is willing to exert e ort incentive compatibility constraint requires a "bonus" payment
. This is similar to the wage payment given to a new manager, except that now not all incentives have to be provided explicitly. The incumbent manager is concerned about his reputation.
This reduces the necessary explicit wage payment by an amount corresponding to his reputational concern (see equation (9)).
The di erence arises because only the incumbent, but not the new manager is driven by reputational concerns. The latter cannot be held responsible for the initial strategic choice:
A failure to implement the strategy successfully, does not allow the market to update its belief over the new manager's ability to take good strategic decisions. Therefore reputational concerns provide incentives to the incumbent manager, but not to the new manager.
This result di ers from standard results in the literature (e.g., Holmstrom, 1982, Gibbons and Murphy, 1992) , where a manager's compensation contract is determined only on the basis of his current reputation and his remaining reputational concerns. We show that managers receive very di erent compensation contracts solely on the basis of whether or not they have worked in the rm before, and thereby had an opportunity to a ect the distribution of the rm's cash ows beyond the time horizon of their own tenure.
Finally, note that (8) is a su cient condition such that the rm is better o paying a wage that induces e ort exertion, than not paying the wage and accepting the low e ort level. If (8) does not hold, wages would optimally be set to zero and the manager would not exert e ort. The latter case is obviously not interesting and we therefore make the following assumption for the remainder of the paper:
Assumption 1 :Inequality (8) holds for all realizations of 1 .
The above assumption is stronger than necessary. A weaker condition would require high e ort to be desirable only along the optimal path of employment policy / strategy choice.
without monetary compensation, merely in order to improve his reputation. In this case, however, he prefers to leave the rm and free ride on the e ort exerted by a new manager. If the rm wishes to retain the incumbent manager it therefore has to pay a positive wage to ensure a binding participation constraint.
Writing down the corresponding conditions is straightforward, but since it does not add anything to the analysis we ease the exposition by making the stronger assumption 1.
A.2. Optimal wage contracts and retention decision if 1 6 = 0
Let us now consider the case in which the board decides to switch strategy. We can then investigate the optimal wage contract if the incumbent manager is retained or if a new manager is hired. Doing so, and comparing the resulting wage payments, allows us to establish the optimal employment policy, given the rm's decision to change strategy.
Proposition 2 : If the rm wants to change strategy at the interim date, it is optimal to hire a new manager.
According to Proposition 2 the rm will never pursue a new strategy with the incumbent manager. The intuition for this result is as follows. The incumbent manager's reputation is tied to the success of the strategy that he chose. Success of a new strategy therefore implies that the manager's original strategy choice was poor. This gives the manager an inherent interest in making the new strategy fail, which would be interpreted as a vindication of his original choice. As a result the incumbent manager has an incentive not to put e ort into implementing the new strategy. The rm can overcome this bias if it provides su ciently strong explicit incentives. This, however, is more expensive than simply hiring a new manager, who has no vested interest in the rm's chosen strategy. Thus, the same reputational concerns that made it cheap to employ the incumbent manager to implement the original strategy, now make it expensive to employ him to implement a new strategy.
The only case where the incumbent manager is equally well suited as a new manager to implement the new strategy, is when he has no reputational concerns at all.
This result is important, because it characterizes the reason why in practice there is frequently a close association between a particular strategy and the manager who implements it. We depart from the assumption often made in the literature that managers have an inherent productivity advantage with regard to a particular strategy (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) . Managers in our model have no such productivity advantage, but they happen to implement only those strategies that they have chosen originally. This is because an association between the cost of incentivizing a manager and the type of strategy he implements arises endogenously from the manager's reputational concerns. It would in principle be straightforward to require from the agent that he accept a strategy change after poor performance and implement the new strategy. This, however, would make it di cult for the manager to be genuinely interested in seeing the strategy succeed.
A.3. Optimal strategy change
The full solution to the rm's problem requires determining when it is optimal to change strategy. Trivially, it is never optimal to change strategy after good rst period performance
( 1 = 1 and/or = 0 ), since it is then known that the strategy in place is already the best available. After poor performance ( 1 = 0 and 6 = 0 ) and in the absence of an agency problem, the rm should switch strategy if this improves the probability of operating the correct strategy (see Lemma 1 and condition (5) for when to change strategy).
The following Proposition states when it is optimal to change strategy in the presence of an agency problem.
Proposition 3 : It is optimal for the rm to continue with the existing strategy after poor rst period performance 1 = 0 and
, where
and to change strategy otherwise.
The optimal point at which a switch in strategy should occur, changes in the presence of an agency problem. This is because the wage payments depend on which strategy is continued.
Corollary 2 : Strategy choice displays inertia in the sense that
When 1 = 0 1 6 = 0 the rm hangs on to the old strategy even though the board knows that another strategy, namely , is more likely to be the correct choice. This is because the wage payment required for the incumbent manager to exert e ort to implement the original strategy is lower than the wage payment required for the new manager to do so with the new strategy. It follows that shareholders are reluctant to change strategy. Recall from Lemma 1 that shareholders change strategy after 6 = 0 if and only if
Hence, the rm switches strategy less often than would be optimal without agency problems.
The rm exhibits inertia in adopting a new strategy.
Moreover, the gap between expected wage payments
under strategy continuity and
under strategy change becomes more pronounced if the incumbent manager has stronger reputational concerns. The higher the reputational concerns of the manager, the stronger the bias towards sticking to the old strategy. In the extreme opposite case where there are no reputational concerns the rm's decision to change strategy would be una ected by the agency problem and the optimal threshold would be
Note that it is the combination of reputational concerns and moral hazard that gives rise to strategy inertia. As stated in Lemma 1, reputational concerns alone do not induce inertia.
Moreover, when there is moral hazard without reputational concerns (i.e., the special case above where = 0), we get = 1 6 = 0 and hence no strategy inertia.
B. The cost of entrenchment
The above analysis showed that managerial entrenchment results from a combination of reputational concerns and the long-term impact of strategic decisions. Entrenchment here simply refers to the observation that the manager is not red although he performed poorly.
In the present context this is not a bad thing per se: an incumbent manager is cheaper to employ, and therefore the board retains him. One can, however, easily imagine a context where the type of entrenchment identied in our paper is costly. This would be the case when the threat of dismissal helps to incentivize a manager (see Spear and Wang, 1995) .
Consider the following dynamic extension of our model. Suppose the manager can improve the distribution of rst period cash ows by exerting costly and unobservable e ort.
The resulting moral hazard problem necessitates that the board determine a series of wage payments, so that e ort is exerted at the initial and the interim date. The board's date 1 employment decision now directly a ects the manager's initial e ort incentives: If he is red after poor performance, the manager loses his second period agency rent. This increases his incentives to exert e ort initially, reducing the date 1 wage payment required to satisfy his incentive compatibility constraint. There may thus be a benet of ring a poorly performing manager. 9 This benet in our setting can only be reaped if the board can commit to this ring policy: Otherwise it will nd itself preferring to retain the poorly performing incumbent, undermining the incentives provided by the threat of dismissal. Moreover, committing to re a poorly performing manager may not be easy, since both rm and manager prefer at the interim date to change this provision. There is therefore little that can stop them from tearing up the original contract and renegotiating, resulting in the incumbent staying with the rm.
IV. When good managers can rescue bad strategies
The model developed in the previous sections emphasizes the importance of strategy choice.
In particular, high cash-ows arise if and only if the right strategy is chosen. Manager's 9 Note that this contrasts with other results in the literature on dynamic contracting, e.g., v. Thadden (1995) and Almazan and Suarez (2003) . In those papers the rm's interim e cient decision may be to liquidate the rm (v. Thadden) or re the manager (Almazan and Suarez), and this may reduce the manager's ex ante e ort incentives. In those papers there is therefore a role for long-term contracts that bind the rm to retaining the manager at the interim date. In our model such contracts do not help, because the rm's interim e cient decision already involves retaining the manager more often than may be ex ante desirable.
type only a ects project value through his ability to choose the right strategy. We now relax this assumption by allowing a manager's type also to a ect cash ows through an ability to implement a given strategy successfully. We therefore assume the following. If the strategy chosen at = 1 is the model is as before, i.e., any manager, regardless of type, generates a high cash ow 2 with e ort dependent probability 2 . However, if a poor strategy has been chosen ( 1 6 = ), a high ability manager exerting e ort 2 can now generate a high cash-ow 2 with probability 2 , where [0 1]. A good manager can thus rescue a bad strategy. A low ability manager, on the other hand, can never generate a high cash ow from a poor strategy.
For = 0, we are in the case previously analyzed: Managerial ability is crucial for strategy choice, but does not matter for strategy implementation, where e ort alone is required. In the other extreme case where = 1, managerial ability does not matter for strategy choice since a high ability manager is equally likely to generate a high second period cash ow, regardless of which strategy was chosen initially. Managerial ability, however, is now crucial for successful strategy implementation. One can thus think of as determining the legacy potential of a strategy. When is low, future cash ows will be largely determined by the strategy chosen initially. Even if a new, high ability manager is hired at a later stage it will be di cult for him to turn a poor strategy into a success. Conversely, when is high, a strategy's success depends largely on a manager's ability to implement it. The original choice matters less and we can say that the strategy has little legacy potential.
Allowing for 0 has several implications. Firstly, new managers have now reputation concerns, even if they are not responsible for the strategy choice. This inuences their wage, and thereby the cost of managerial turnover. Secondly, expected cash-ows now depend directly on the expected ability (reputation) of the manager in place. This provides another channel through which managerial turnover and strategy choice are linked.
We proceed as before to determine the board's date 1 decisions, conditional on 0 and 1 . We denote 
And if the incumbent is replaced:
Clearly, The following proposition states how the ability of good managers to rescue bad strategies modies the replacement decision of the board, in case the initial strategy is maintained. to work, which reduces the cost of hiring a new manager. Also, replacing the manager increases expected cash-ows because a new manager is more likely to be of a high type than an incumbent with a poor performance history. Both e ects make it more desirable to replace the incumbent. Moreover, both e ects increase with , so that when is high enough, the board optimally replaces the incumbent, even when he decides to stick to the original strategy. This allows us to ensure that ˆ 1 for a set of model parameters with positive measure. However, because the incumbent has stronger reputational concerns than the new manager in the sense that , we cannot ensure that ˆ 1 for any choice of model parameters. The result of Proposition 1 (the incumbent is never red when the strategy is maintained) would therefore hold for any .
The next proposition explores the board's employment decision when the new strategy is chosen. When is small relative to the sabotage e ect is weakened. This is because a change in strategy is now relatively likely to lead to a bad strategy. A high cash ow in this case
indicates that the incumbent manager may be a high type who rescued a bad strategy chosen by the board. As a result, the incumbent's reputational concern may be stronger than the new manager's. The reputational concern and the direct cash ow e ect thus go in opposite directions. For either employment policy may therefore be optimal, depending on parameter values.
The above analysis delivers two clear insights. Firstly, the ability for good managers to rescue bad strategies biases the board's decision towards replacing the incumbent because of a direct cash-ow e ect. Secondly, the main results of the paper are robust to allowing 0 for not too large. Indeed, a large can be interpreted as the fact that only manager's talent at implementing strategies matters, and that strategy choice is irrelevant. When is not too large, the incumbent's reputational concerns are higher than those of a new manager if the initial strategy is maintained, while the incumbent has an incentive to sabotage a new strategy. This naturally introduces a correlation between managerial turnover and strategy change.
We conclude this section by discussing whether rms still exhibit strategy inertia when good managers can rescue bad strategies. Proposition 6 illustrates the robustness of our analysis for some values of .
Proposition 6 : There exists a threshold 0 such that if the rm exhibits strategy inertia, in the sense that it sticks to the initial strategy 0 following poor performance ( 1 = 0 and 6 = 0 ), even though is more likely to be the correct strategy.
Recall from propositions 4 and 5 that when is not too high, the manager's replacement policy is unchanged compared to the basic case. This implies that for su ciently low, career concerns remain higher for incumbents. This induces strategy inertia at the rm level, and translates into a positive correlation between managerial retention and strategy continuation. When becomes larger, the rm can exhibit inertia or not, depending on parameter values determining the strength of career concerns. An increase in can be viewed as manager's talent at implementing strategies being more and more important compared to strategy choice itself. At the extreme, if = 1, any good manager can rescue a bad strategy, and strategy choice loses importance. One consequence is that as increases, potential successor managers' reputation concerns increase, and managerial turnover increases even when the strategy is continued. The correlation between managerial retention and strategy continuation thus decreases.
V. Extensions

A. External versus internal succession
Reputation concerns can also a ect managers at other levels of the hierarchy. For instance, it is likely that the rm's top management shares some responsibility in the initial strategy choice. This ties their own reputation to the initial strategy's performance, although the link is weaker than for the CEO. This a ects the decision whether to replace CEOs by internal or external successors. An internal successor may be preferable over the incumbent or an external successor for two reasons. Firstly, even though the CEO is most strongly associated with the strategy, an internal candidate may have stronger reputational concerns, maybe because he is younger. If the initial strategy is continued, an incumbent may nevertheless be replaced by an internal successor.
The second reason becomes apparent when we consider the case where 0. In this case we identied a second motive for managerial replacement, namely to improve the expected quality of the manager running the rm (and thereby possibly rescuing a bad strategy).
Although an internal successor's reputation may have su ered a little, it may be less negatively a ected than the incumbent CEO's. At the same time, the internal candidate may have stronger reputational concerns than an external appointment, because of the shared responsibility for the initial choice. An internal successor, may thus be more likely to have high ability than the incumbent, while having stronger reputational concerns than an outsider. In the parameter region where the incumbent is retained (i.e. when ), the board may thus prefer to replace the incumbent internally, rather than retaining him.
However, if the strategy is to be changed, a top manager has the same 'sabotage' incentives as the incumbent, and there is no reason for the board to opt for an internal succession.
Internal successions should therefore be more prominent under strategy continuity, while external CEOs are more likely appointed when the strategy changes. Also, outside appointments should receive higher average salaries and more performance sensitive pay than inside successors. This follows from the fact that the former have less reputational capital vested in the rm's original stategy choice, increasing the explicit wage necessary to induce high implementation e ort.
B. Bias in investment horizons
In the above analysis the CEO is crucial for strategy choice. This, combined with reputational concerns, drives a wedge between his and a potential successor's incentives to implement the It would be quite natural to extend our model in this direction. Since a manager who chooses a strategy with legacy potential becomes entrenched, this might suggest that CEOs prefer choosing such strategies. This raises a further interesting issue once one allows for di erent strategy horizons. The extreme case of a strategy without legacy potential is a short-term strategy, i.e., one that has a cash ow impact for only one period. The manager would not have an opportunity to entrench himself using such strategies. He may therefore prefer to choose a long-term strategy (with legacy potential), even when that may not be optimal for shareholders. This may help explain the often cited conict of interest over investment horizons, whereby rm managers complain that their shareholders are "shorttermist". Our model suggests a di erent angle on this problem, namely that shareholders may have very good reasons to be weary of managers' preference for long-term investments.
This contrasts with previous work on investment horizons, notably v. Thadden (1995) .
Here managers may prefer to take short-term strategies even when the long-term strategy is optimal, unless the rm commits not to terminate the manager. A key di erence driving these opposing results is that in v.Thadden (1995) the strategy's horizon is unknown to the board / shareholders, while it is observable in the case described above.
VI. Empirical implications
In this Section we derive some empirical implications supported by our analysis, discuss their relevance to address actual empirical ndings, and propose new possible empirical tests to distinguish our theory from others. Our theory makes several predictions that relate a rm's legacy potential and a CEO's reputation concerns to managerial turnover and strategy change. We will begin this section by proposing proxies for 'legacy potential' and for 'managerial reputation concerns', the accurate measurement of which will obviously be crucial to a proper implementation of empirical tests. We then describe empirical implications.
A rm's legacy potential captures the extent to which a strategic decision has an irreversable impact on future cash ows, even if the incumbent manager departs. A variable that captures this underlying idea is the length of the rm's product life cycle: the longer the life-cycle, the longer the impact of a strategy decision. A second proxy for legacy potential is in our view the ratio of xed over variable costs. The higher the ratio, the more legacy potential we would expect.
CEOs reputation concerns reect the extent to which CEOs care about their future reputation, as well as the extent to which CEOs' reputation is a ected by future performance.
An obvious proxy for reputation concerns is manager's age: The future career opportunities of younger CEOs depend crucially on rm performance during their tenure. An (inverse) proxy for reputation concerns can also be CEOs media coverage. This has been used in the literature as a proxy for managerial talent (see Milbourn (2003) ). Visible and talented CEOs have already established reputations, and are less likely to have reputation concerns, while CEOs with less visibility or more negative media appraisals need to restore reputation.
With these proxies in mind, we can formulate the following empirical predictions related to turnover determinants, the correlation between employment decisions and strategic decisions, and CEO pay determinants.
A. Determinants of managerial turnover
Our theory predicts a negative correlation between legacy potential and the frequency of (forced) managerial turnover. The reason is that shareholders are more reluctant to dismiss
CEOs with a vested interest in the strategy they formulated in the rst place (see Proposition   4 ). This e ect will be stronger for younger and less established CEOs, or for CEOs who have more discretion regarding strategy choice (Gopalan, Milbourn, and Song (2009) propose a set of empirical proxies for the latter). An alternative test for this prediction would be to measure whether CEOs are less likely to be dismissed when they chose a major strategic orientation, compared to when they inherit a strategy chosen by others. Similarly, in regressions that try to explain turnover in response to poor performance, we would expect the sensitivity of turnover with respect to performance to be lower when the legacy potential is higher. While the e ect of legacy potential has, to our knowledge, not been tested in the literature, the above prediction is consistent with the ndings of Falato, Li and Milbourn (2009): They document that talent signicantly increases the probability of forced turnover. This is in line with our view that CEOs with less reputation concerns (with an already established good reputation) are more likely to be red after bad performance.
Also, we would expect the probability of dismissal to be low in the early years of a manager's tenure and increase after some time. The hazard rate of managerial turnover should thus be hump shaped in a manager's tenure. This is consistent with the empirical ndings in Allgood and Farrell (2003) and Coates and Kraakman (2007) . We would also expect to see the peak in the hazard rate later when the legacy potential increases, or when reputation concerns increase. For instance, managerial turnover should be lower in the early stages of the product life cycle, but not so in the late stages.
These predictions allow our theory to be tested against other theories of turnover. Matching theory typically predicts a downward sloping hazard function (see Jovanovic, 1979) , although it may also be hump shaped, depending on parameter values. However, in matching theory the parameters that determine the hazard function are exogenous, and we are not aware of any attempt to relate rm characteristics to the shape of the hazard function. Also, matching theory struggles with some aspects of the data. In empirical studies of worker (not CEO) turnover the hazard rate was found to reach its maximum after 3 months of employment (Farber, 1994) . It is hard for matching theory to explain this discrepancy, but follows very naturally from our theory: in our theory non-CEO employees do not choose strategies and therefore leave no signicant legacy behind. They are therefore not entrenched.
B. Employment and strategic decisions
Our model predicts a positive correlation between managerial turnover and strategy change (see Proposition 2). Romanelli and Tushman (1994) nd empirically that CEO turnover increases the probability to engage in strategic change in the minicomputer producers industry.
This result is also supported by Lant and Milliken (1992) , and Gordon, Stewart, Sweo and
Luker (2000) in the furniture and computer software industries. More importantly, both Romanelli and Tushman (1994), and Gordon et al. (2000) nd no direct evidence that poor past performance per se a ects the probability of strategic reorientation. This is consistent with our ndings that (i) rms exhibit strategic inertia and do not respond necessarily to poor performance by changing strategy, and (ii) a strategy change is implemented by changing manager.
Other theories also predict such a correlation. In Shleifer and Vishny (1989) , managers are replaced when the strategy changes because managers no longer have the appropriate skills. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) explore the idea of managerial style, predicting that managers choose strategies to suit their innate skills, so that managerial change leads to strategy change. Our theory questions the need to resort to manager specic skills in order to explain the empirically observed association between managers and strategies. Moreover, by developing a theory purely based on incentives, we are able to provide additional predictions on the factors determining when the correlation between manager and strategy should be more or less pronounced. In particular, when the legacy potential is higher, there should be a stronger correlation. Similarly, when reputational concerns of the manager are higher, the correlation should increase.
Last, strategic change can also be captured by capital reallocation inside or between rms. The change in strategy in our model can be interpreted as the redeployment of existing assets to a more protable alternative use, or can involve the sale of existing assets, if such redeployment inside the rm is not possible. We showed that reputational concerns can impede capital reallocation to more productive uses. Another prediction of the model is that (otherwise benecial) capital reallocations should be less frequent, the stronger the reputational concerns of rms.
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) study the cyclical properties of capital reallocations, and nd that the benets of capital reallocation are fully exploited during booms, while they are not during recessions. 10 According to the authors, this suggests more contractual or informa- We can also explore how the quality of corporate governance (in particular, the quality of the board) inuences CEO pay. In our model, board quality can be captured by the probability of generating a signal that corresponds to the good strategy. One clear prediction of the model is that conditional on the CEO being replaced, the incentive pay of his successor should decrease with the quality of the board. The new CEO's incentive pay is measured by his wage The model provides the more precise prediction that successor's pay decreases with board strength, which to our knowledge has not been tested yet.
VII. Conclusion
This paper explores a rm's decision to replace a poorly performing CEO with a new CEO in a context where strategic decisions have a long-term impact on the rm's cash ows. Such a legacy implies that a new CEO's performance is partially a ected by something he bears no responsibility for, namely the previous CEO's choice of rm strategy. This renders the incentive problem of a new CEO more severe than it would be for the incumbent CEO.
As a result the rm will not always wish to re the CEO even if he performs poorly -the incumbent is entrenched. In contrast to much of the literature on CEO turnover, which views entrenchment as a result of weak boards, we argue that entrenchment may be optimal for shareholders.
We then study the board's decision to change strategy and CEO. Strategy change and managerial turnover are closely associated, and the (endogenous) cost of managerial turnover makes it more expensive for the rm to change strategy. This leads to 'strategic inertia' in the rm's decision. These results arise purely from managerial incentive problems and in spite of the fact that all managers in our model are ex ante identical. We thus challenge the view that managerial style, i.e., an innate manager specic skill, is required to explain the observation that managers in practice are associated with certain types of strategies.
Last, we explore how manager's ability to implement strategies a ects the decision to change managers and strategies. We show that weakening a strategy's legacy potential weakens entrenchment and strategic inertia. Finally, we distinguish between internal and external replacements and show that when the legacy potential is weakened, an internal successor may be preferred over an external one.
The model highlights a new potential determinant of managerial turnover, namely the legacy potential of strategic choices. It allows to derive numerous empirical predictions to enrich empirical studies on managerial turnover, and to distinguish our theory from others. We predict that managerial turnover after poor performance is less likely when legacy potential is strong, and reputation concerns are important. Moreover, we are able to link managerial turnover to strategy change, and CEO pay. The model predicts a higher (incentive and average) pay for newly hired CEOs replacing poorly performing predecessors. Finally, it allows to distinguish internal and external successions: internal successions should be positively correlated with strategy continuity, while external successions should be correlated with strategy change.
Although this paper focuses on the board's decision to replace a CEO and/or a rm's strategy, we believe that the underlying economic mechanism that we identify has many other interesting applications. One such application would be to look more carefully at the relationship between a CEO and top management just below the CEO level. On the one hand, lower tier executives may have an interest to please the CEO they are working for.
On the other hand, if things go wrong, those managers who did not associate themselves too closely with the outgoing CEO may be in a better position to succeed him. Our approach may thus provide a framework to study career concerns in a more realistic setting where career progression is not just a function of a simple performance measure.
Proof of Lemma 1: In the benchmark, shareholders choose e ort 2 the strategy 1 and the re-employment decision to maximize their expected pay-o , written as:
where ( 2 1 ) stands for the wage given to the manager as a function of 2 1 and . The manager's utility function can therefore be expressed as the sum of his wage and his expected reputation minus the cost of e ort. For instance, if the incumbent is retained for two periods, we write:
A priori, even if he is paid a wage only when exerting the prescribed level of e ort, a manager might be tempted to deviate because of his reputation concerns. Note however that with a linear reputation function, (
, any level of e ort provides the same expected reputation benet. A manager's participation constraint thus boils down to comparing the expected wage to the cost of e ort. It follows that the same wage has to be given if the incumbent is retained, or if he is replaced by a new manager. Last, when 1 = 1 or when = 0 then the optimal strategy is 1 = 0 . Given the above discussion, shareholders solve:
Note that (A4) must be binding at the optimum. Replacing (A4) into the objective we get: When 1 = after 6 = 0 , it is optimal to induce 2 if and only if
Conditions (A8) and (A7) are the conditions stated in lemma 1. Last, given the e ort 2 , it is straightforward to see that :
Proof of Lemma 2: When 1 = 1 or = 0 , the optimal strategy choice is 1 = 0 and the reputation of the incumbent is equal to 1 whatever the date 2 cash-ow realization. By assumption, the reputation of the new manager is una ected by the cash-ow realized at date 2. The incentive compatibility constraint of manager , ( ), is the same whether he is an incumbent or a new manager:
To maximize expected prot, the board minimizes manager 's expected wage subject to ( ), which yields:
It is straightforward to see that this pair of wages satises ( ) with equality, and that ( ) does not bind. This is optimal if the expected prot of shareholders under 2 is larger than their expected prot under 2 , i.e., if 
which we assume to hold.
Proof of Proposition 1:
We determine the optimal wages if shareholders want to induce e ort at = 1 (below we will provide su cient conditions for this to be the case). Given this assumption, the optimal second period wages minimize expected wage payments subject to the manager's participation and incentive compatibility constraints.
Case 1: Suppose the incumbent manager is retained. His incentive compatibility constraint ( ) is generically written as:
where 1 = 1 = 0 dened in equation (2) . Equation (A14) can be rewritten as:
where 0.
Moreover, we must ensure that the incumbent manager prefers to stay in the rm, rather than resign at = 1 and enjoy reputation benets at = 2 as a function of the rm's performance. The incumbent manager's participation constraint ( ) is given by
Last, we impose limited liability on the manager's side: all wages must be non negative.
To maximize shareholders' prots, one chooses the minimum wages that satisfy (A27) and (A16). Clearly, 0 0 1 = 0 = 0 is optimal. If constraint (A27) is binding, the optimal contract is: 
It is easy to see that this contract satises the manager's participation constraint i :
If the above condition is violated, the optimal contract sets incumbent manager's reputation evolves as follows: If 2 = 2 , it is revealed that the new strategy is correct, and therefore the initial strategy choice of the manager was wrong, and 2 1 6 = 0 = 0.
If 2 = 0 we have:
Note that in case of a strategy change, the value of the incumbent manager's reputation is lower when 2 = 2 compared to 2 =0, i.e.,
0.
If a new manager is hired, ( ) is given by (A20), except that 1 = 1 6 = 0 dened in equation (3) . Therefore, 
Note that 2 2 , hence 1 6 = 0 .
Proof of Proposition 4: First note that 0 does not a ect the incumbent manager's reputation update. This is because a high-type (low-type) manager always picks the right (wrong) strategy.
For the same reason does not a ect the probability of obtaining a high cash-ow when the incumbent is retained and therefore 1 = 0 = 2 1 = 0 . The incumbent's incentive compatibility constraint is thus still described by (A27). 
where the superscript in the RHS reects the fact that the incumbent is replaced when he resigns.
Since is linear, the expected value of incumbent's reputation is the same whether he implements the strategy himself or resigns. Therefore, the incumbent manager's wage is the same as before: 
The new manager's participation constraint ( ) is written as (A45)
Next, see that: 
Simple computations show that 0 . It follows that if the board decides to change strategy, the expected wage is lower if that new strategy is implemented by a newly hired manager.
Combined with the fact that 1 6 = 0 1 6 = 0 , the expected payo of shareholders is higher when they replace the incumbent after a strategy change. 
Proof of Proposition
